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The 
Traditional LNG Chain
In the traditional LNG chain, the individual parties along the chain, i.e. the LNG producers, shipper, gas importer/buyer and gas distributor/transporter of LNG has always been clear. The allocation of risks along the chain and the burden of financial and legal risks for each of these parties were also ascertained. The gas producer on the LNG chain bore the burden of production and upstream risks and the buyer undertook the downstream market risk. Depending on whether the LNG supply was on CIF, FOB or Ex-ship terms, the cost of shipping and its risks were allocated according to the terms of the LNG sales. Many of the Far Eastern LNG supply contracts were very much in the nature of a one to one relationship for the Seller supplying and dedicating its entire production to a single or principal buyer, although the buyer may have several sources from different sellers. The buyer bore the shipping costs and product loss under FOB terrns and the seller undertook these risks under CIF and Ex-ship sales, although the buyer still paid for the shipping costs under these terms in its price.
Current LNG Market
The analysis of the current world LNG market is that there will be more prospective LNG supply capacity than there is buyer demand. This has been the general conclusion over the last few years and recent events in the Far East have exacerbated the perception of LNG supply in excess of demand. that has struck many Asian countries, particularly the major LNG buyers such as Japan and Korea has resulted in little growth in energy demand. This coupled with a worldwide trend towards liberalisation deregulation, partial privatisation and participation of IPPs in the power supply market and particularly in these countries meant that LNG demand expectations from this region is uncertain, making commitment to large long-term LNG contracts for the short term future outlook very difficult.
New LNG players
However, at the same time, there are a number of significant changes with the entry into the world LNG market of new players. In India, the government has approved more than twenty LNG projects with the most advanced Enron project in Dabhol coming on-stream shortly and the anticipated rapid development of projects like Petronet and British Gas in Gujarat over the next couple of years. China has conducted a feasibility study for the establishment of an LNG receiving terminal at Shanzhen in the province of Guangdong. There has been talk of Thailand developing LNG terminals, but with the recent economic downturn, it's unlikely that this will happen in the near future. There has also been press reports about an LNG import project for Brazil, the development of the Bilbao terminal in Spain and for additional LNG import terminals in Portugal, Greece and Puerto Rico.
The entry of many of these new players is unlike the development of the traditional greenfield projects that have been built specifically for a principal buyer. We now have a single project selling on long term basis to its main buyer/sponsor of the project or semi long term basis to multiple buyers. Examples of this recent trend are the multiple buyers from projects like the Qatar RasGas Project selling on long term basis to Japan, Korea a sponsor in its project and also to new buyers like Petronet in India. The Trinidad-Tobago project is supplying on long term basis to both Cabot in the USA and Enagas in Spain. The ADGAS project in Abu Dhabi has diversified its supply to its long-term Japanese customer TEPCO and also has supplies on short term spot basis to Europe, USA, Korea and currently semi long term to India. Oman LNG is supplying to Japan, Korea and also India.
Single Buyer and Seller
The basic tenet of the traditional LNG chain of single buyer and seller and the concept of the LNG project as a "marriage" of two partners is no longer the case here. These new LNG players are entering a market of excess plant capacity on specific projects, a surplus that has been created due to the downturn of energy demand from the flagging economies of the Far-Eastern markets and greater production efficiencies of new plant technology.
The effect of this is that sellers will now have to cope with more complicated and varied contracting structures and financing arrangements of the different buyers. They also have to deal with a variety of pricing terms and structures depending on the situation of the buyer's market; ranging from net back prices based on buyer's gas resale prices, to prices indexed to competing fuels other than the Japanese Crude price index, some of these including coal, naptha and local electricity indices as is the case in the Indian gas market. The buyer may also be an independent power project ("IPP") and LNG prices may be tied to tariff payments pursuant to power purchase agreements ("PPA").
The seller will also have to balance the interests of the principal buyers and quite often the sponsors of the project against these newcomers. In the more monopolistic market of a small world of LNG buyers and sellers, many projects have maintained an expressed or implicit understanding that LNG will be sold on a uniform pricing mechanism. Pitched against price negotiations between the sponsors of these LNG projects on future prices, it is questionable whether the new buyers are achieving as competitive a price as may be expected from the competitive tendering and bid process for LNG supplies as with the LNG projects in India.
Dedication of supplies Another feature of the traditional LNG supply contract is the dedication of the gas reserves of LNG producers solely to its main buyer/sponsor or at least that priority will be given to the requirements of the main buyer in the event of any excess capacity that the producer has to offer. In the light of today's market with multiple buyers from any single project, the monopolistic market of a few buyers and sellers in the LNG industry has definitely taken a tum, and perhaps this may be for the better. LNG producers are only beginning to experience and respond to cost pressures that has had a major effect on the oil and gas industry such as in the North Sea for the last decade. The pressures on LNG producers to pursue and explore new and different markets will definitely impact on the current "monogamous relationship" of a single buyer and seller paradigm, specifically in areas where supply has been dedicated solely to a single buyer or for that matter to a specified destination with high emphasis on security of off-take and deliveries. The opening of the LNG market to multiple buyers with greater regional diversification may give rise to the development to what has been an anticipated LNG spot market complemented with the possibility of LNG swaps between multiple buyers. Such an example can be seen in the Trinidad project where Cabot LNG and Enagas have contracted for the entire off take and have a right to swap and exchange LNG between themselves. Since Cabot is shipping LNG westwards from Algeria and Enagas eastwards from Trinidad, the potential for swaps is high. Such swaps will also free up what is currently tight shipping capacity for most LNG projects, hence enabling a project to expand supplies and consequently reduce supply costs through more cost effective shipping and usage.
It is questionable therefore in a market of multiple buyers and multi-lateral trade whether sellers can continue to provide or buyers can expect assurances of dedicated supplies from LNG sellers as with the traditional contracts. Such restrictive covenants may be acceptable where primary buyers have invested in seller's facilities but as such buyers are now "reneging" on their take-or-pay terms and committed quantities, it is unlikely that sellers can or will continue to provide such onerous undertakings to its buyers.
Take or Pay Terms As stated above, in exchange for the undertaking of the seller to dedicate its production and plant capacity to the buyer, the buyer had to commit to specified quantities under take or pay terms. Under the traditional LNG sales and purchase contracts, gas was traded and sold on a long term take or pay basis with long term pricing, on fixed and ascertainable quantities for sale and purchase on an exclusive basis. In traditional contracts the margin of flexibility for take or pay terms was anything in the region of 5 %-10 %.
The nature of such take or pay terms was not unreasonable where, as with the requirements for dedication of supply, both the buyer and seller have incurred extensive investments in developing its individual facilities based on a sole source of supply or in the case of the seller, completely dependent on supply to a single buyer. This premise is not the case with the new LNG buyers, who are purchasing from excess or increased capacities of existing and new LNG projects. In fact, the reality that LNG sellers are pressured by the downturn in demand from the Far East to sell some of these capacities may dictate the take or pay terms on some of these contracts. Furthermore, with the liberalisation of monopoly markets both in Europe and the Far East, it would seem that long term take or pay arrangements would be coming under continuous pressure.
In Europe, the example of liberalisation and restructuring of the gas market in the UK has given rise to gas being traded bilaterally and on the International Petroleum Exchange with gas price moving independently of oil prices and the prices of other competing fuels. Such trading has occurred even in transportation and storage rights. Such similar changes will be seen to take place in the Far Eastern markets as well.
Japan is currently pursuing measures to liberalise its electricity markets and this will definitely have repercussions for those on long term take or pay contracts for supply of LNG into Japan. Korea is embarking on the same route of economic restructuring and deregulation with the privatisation of its government-invested electrical and gas companies. Such changes will put pressure not only on the need to import LNG on a more competitive prices, but also on better take or pay terms margins and also flexibility in fixed quantity options.
However, it is questionable to what extent liberalisation or deregulation in these markets will have and the extent to which long term take or pay provision will be affected. In the UK gas market, a competitive market has opened up for supply of gas in most sectors but the upstream market is still characterised by long term take or pay contracts for gas supply agreements at inflexible prices which move by reference to factors such as general inflation and oil prices.
The introduction of competition in the traditional and also the new LNG markets will no doubt as it has in the UK market reduce prices to and benefit consumers in both the industrial and commercial sectors, but it seems that consequently it may be the buyer who is still bearing the costs being lumbered with traditional long tenn take or pay contracts on the upstream side and pressured to provide competitive prices downstream.
Choice of Law
With the expansion of LNG markets from the traditional Far Eastern regions to the other continents of China, India and South America, the choice of law for LNG contracts has also taken a different and important perspective.
Traditional LNG contracts in the past have been mainly governed by New York law. The reason for this being that with the number of multi-national parties involved in LNG projects, the choice of a law independent of the consortium parties often resolved to New York law. It has also been the view that New York jurisdiction have had greater exposure to gas contracts, particularly on take or pay clauses. The choice of governing law and the dispute resolution provisions is important as it determines how, and subject to what law, the terms of the contract are interpreted: the choice of law is therefore critical to ensuring that the contract means what the parties think it means.
One of the problems with the governing law and dispute resolutions is that they tend to be treated as part of the boiler plate of the contract and is therefore given far less attention than the operative provisions at the front. However, it should not be forgotten that the dispute resolutions operate as a separate, severable contract, and need to be as clear and workable as the rest of the contract. These issues are as critical for the success of a project, and the parties must have certainty as to the meaning and interpretation of a contract to ensure quick, impartial and effective dispute resolution.
There is generally a significant degree of freedom in choosing or negotiating an appropriate governing law provision, particularly for contracts between nongovernmental organisations. However, in contracting with foreign states and foreign government organisations, it may be a requirement of the government or government organisations that the contract be subject to the law of the host government. Whatever this choice may be, or how difficult to negotiate, staying silent should be the last resort. If a contract is silent on the issue of governing law, there will be no certainty as to how and subject to what law the contract will be interpreted, and if a dispute does arise, the whole issue of what the governing law is will have first to be resolved before the dispute can be resolved. This will only lead to uncertainty and delay.
English or New York Law
One of the issues which frequently arise in the choice of law for LNG contracts is the comparative merits of English as opposed to New York law, the two most frequent choices of law.
The comparative merits is an interesting area of law, and requires greater consideration than just a nationalistic knee jerk reaction to the issue at hand. In broad terms, both are acceptable jurisdictions for any project with complex documentation as in the case of an LNG project. Both systems are responsible and sophisticated systems having developed in major commercial and banking centres, and both follow case law precedent which tends to provide greater predictability.
Both systems are long established and are examples of common law systems; and each regards the decisions of the courts of the other state as constituting "persuasive authority". i.e. New York law decisions can form part of the development of English law and vice versa. The choice, of course, will ultimately depend upon the identity, objectives and respective bargaining strengths of the parties involved and the nature of the project itself. However, the principal issues, and the principal areas where there are differences between the two legal systems are in relation to arbitration and litigation processes, questions of contractual interpretation and levels of damages and costs.
Major differences Where arbitration is concerned, both England and New York have established long traditions of support for arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. London, with the London Court of International Arbitration, probably has a greater reputation as an acceptable international arbitration centre, whereas New York is seen as being insular and handling fewer international disputes.
In terms of procedure, arbitration in England adopts a relatively forceful approach to compliance, and to ensuring speed and certainty, whereas the insistence in the US on "due process" tends to lead to more involved procedure, greater cost and more reluctance to enforce judgements, actions and timetables.
In litigation, there are again a number of differences. The English system is unitary, whereas in New York, the split of state and Federal laws can give rise to difficult issues of the inter-relationship between these laws and their applicability in particular circumstances. In terms of damages, the principle under English law is that damages should be compensatory (i.e. putting the damaged party in a position he would have been had the contract not been breached), whereas the law of New York law and many US states tends to favour punitive or exemplary damages. In the US, the up-front discovery process can also be enormously costly and time-consuming involving not only documenting discovery but also depositions of witnesses whereas the discovery process in England is less drawn out.
Contractual Interpretation
There are also significant differences between English and New York law in contractual interpretation, but I will comment on the most significant ones that usually arise in disputes.
English law contains a long enshrined principle of privity of contract namely the principle that a person who is not a party to an executed contract or has passed valuable consideration for it cannot benefit from that. By contrast, New York law recognises the concept of third party beneficiary rights, and it is possible for a third party to derive a benefit under a contract to which it is not actually a party.
The second issue in contractual interpretation is the concept of "good faith". Under English law, there is a good faith obligation (for e.g. an agreement to negotiate in good faith or act in good faith in performance of a contract).
Under New York law, there is a duty to negotiate in good faith which can be enforced. Perhaps on the basis that many of the provisions under the traditional LNG contracts such as price negotiations, price reviews, change of circumstances and the long term nature of the contracts which require the parties to negotiate in good faith over time has made New York law the preferred choice of law for many of these contracts.
Ultimately, the choice of governing law on any particular project depends on the nature of the project and the aims and objectives of the parties. Both English and New York laws have the edge over the civil law system in that they both follow precedent, and a body of case law has been compiled in the form of "law reports" for future reference. Both laws benefit from legal precedents from each other and from the other common law jurisdictions.
English law over New York Law
However, if asked to generalise, I would at the risk of sounding biased, suggest that English law has the edge through the acceptance of and familiarity with its legal system, the predictability and certainty which that brings, its robust approach to arbitration, and likely lower level of costs and compensatory level of damages. Also, with a post colonial world for England, many of these countries have built their legal systems on English law foundations which is certainly dominant in most Asian deals.
Change in Contractual Matrix
Another significant change for the LNG industry with the emergence of the new LNG markets is the change in contractual matrix leading to greater complexity in the LNG supply chain. Again, because of the characteristics of these new markets there has been a fundamental change in the risk equation. Financiers cannot be certain that supply contracts into these markets will be sufficient to cover capital costs. In addition, the shift in economic philosophy of many of these markets by the public sector with the encouragement of competitive markets and private sectors has contributed to a disorganisation of the traditional LNG supply chain. More often than before, we now have major elements of the LNG chain being owned by a group of companies in consortium, often with different credit standing, risk appetite and access to cash. The net result is that the balance of risk sharing down the contract chain has become very different.
Furthermore as with many of the projects in the new markets particularly in India, the LNG buyer is a project-financed IPP dependant on a PPA by a state electricity board. The key players in that chain will be the LNG seller, the LNG shipper; the import and regasification terminal (the gas project); the power generator (the power project) and the offtakers of the power (State electricity boards or industrial consumers ).
LNG chain of gas and power project
The complexity for some of these projects is significantly increased where the gas project and the power project are likely greenfield projects being financed on a non or limited recourse basis, and will be dependent on matching back-to-back commitments to secure their respective revenues.
With the nature of such projects, the individual gas and power project will each have a series of key agreements that will provide the financing, which will need to lock together to form a network of interlocking arrangements in order to regulate cashflow and allocate risks. Some of these agreements will include the implementation agreements, the LNG purchase agreement, the PPA, the gas purchase agreement(s), the EPC contracts, the O&M agreements and a host of others. The contractual matrix now begins to look like this.
Contractual matrix
Along with the change in contractual matrix to a more complex labyrinth of contracts that LNG suppliers will now have to deal with, there is also a call for vertical integration across the supply chain, an element of common ownership along the chain which could help to strike a balance between risks and rewards along the chain. This can be seen to be happening in some of the projects in India like the Petronet project with proposals for Rasgas equity in Petronet and vice versa. The objective is not necessarily for all participants to have equal investment, or percentage interest along the entire chain, but to the extent that there is some cross participation in the liquefaction and receiving facilities, some of the complex documentation process and potential project risks such as construction completion risks may be streamlined.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the challenges to the LNG Industry for the future are numerous and these are not just in the legal and contractual aspects, but also from the perspective of pricing, financing, cultural and political aspects. At a time when profit margins are under pressure with the recent spate of low oil prices and the economic downturn in the Far East and the development and expansion of new and existing LNG projects leading to greater supply than demand, LNG sellers will have to pursue markets of greater risks involving greater contractual complexity. However, there is still demand from significant markets which may not have the credit rating of some of the traditional LNG buyers, but nevertheless where there is a desire to sell, with flexibility and imagination on the part of all parties involved the nature of LNG contracts which will evolve for the millennium will be a challenge for the future.
